ADR 0002: appliance-owned trust and renewal¶
Status: accepted architecture, operator decision 2026-10-24.
Decision and rationale¶
Use one appliance-generated root per trust domain, never one universal project CA. Clients trust the root once; a network-isolated constrained issuer handles routine appliance and paired-Server leaves. Network-facing services cannot read the root key. Current lifetimes and provisioning are documented in the identity guide.
Pairing binds exact approved DNS/IP names and CSR proof of possession to the PAKE exchange. Configured suffixes and ranges limit issuance; wildcards, unrelated names and dangerous aliases are rejected. Normal renewal allows the approved set or a subset. Persistent enrollment signing keys, independent of an expired HTTPS leaf, permit disconnected Servers to renew outward to the appliance. Expanded names, lost keys and revoked registrations require explicit recovery.
Stage and validate identity/trust atomically; uncertain post-rename publication must reconcile durable state rather than discard recovery authority. Preserve existing identity, origin, archive and UUID through upgrades. Keep provisional Server trust until appliance-issued trust is validated. Root rollover requires client retrust; issuer rollover under the same root does not.
Consequences and limits¶
CA installation needs explicit OS approval and out-of-band fingerprint checking. Private CRL enforcement is not reliable enough to replace short leaf lifetimes. Encrypted private backup/export is a host-only operation, never a web endpoint. Mobile/offline installation and hot-reload behavior need scoped qualification. See clients and trust gates.